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Abstract 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, fair value accounting in banks has come 
under a great deal of criticism by some who believed bank managers were intentionally 
reclassifying assets to prevent write-downs, or who believed that banks were taking risks with 
fair value assets and liabilities that caused their distressed states. We analyzed banks’ use of fair 
value accounting by using the SEC’s EDGAR database to read and analyze the financial 
statements of public banks which received Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds and 
have since repaid them. We looked to see if banks classified more assets as level 3, the most 
subjective measurement, to avoid write-downs and/or if they held more or fewer fair value assets 
or liabilities in their portfolios when distressed. In determining whether or not a bank is 
distressed, we view a bank as distressed in the quarter prior to receiving TARP funds, and as no 
longer distressed in the quarter in which the final repayment of TARP funds took place. In our 
research, we used data such as the ratio of fair value assets to total assets, fair value liabilities to 
total liabilities, and the composition of fair value assets and liabilities by level (levels 1, 2, and 3) 
from both when the banks were distressed and when they had become stable again. We find 
weak evidence for the “classification effect,” or the idea that bank managers intentionally 
reclassified fair value assets when under distress, and strong evidence for the “portfolio effect,” 
or the idea that banks’ risk appetites significantly changed during the crisis. This suggests that 
while the banks’ risk appetites changed when they were distressed, they were not intentionally 
classifying more assets as level 3. 
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Introduction 
The 2008 financial collapse hit banks and other financial firms the hardest. In October of 
that year, the US Treasury established the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which 
authorized expenditures of $700 billion in an attempt to spur lending and prevent a total collapse 
of the financial system. This amount was later reduced to $475 billion by the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Some people derided TARP as the “bank bailout,” but others believe it prevented a larger 
collapse in the banking industry and in the economy as a whole. Some also criticized the 
lobbying of banks to change fair value accounting rules in their favor in the aftermath of TARP 
(Katz & Westbrook, 2009). Others feared the effect of campaign contributions from banks to the 
politicians who oversaw TARP (Isikoff, 2009). 
With TARP and the financial crisis being such important topics both among academics 
and among the general public, research on the role of fair value accounting in the financial crisis 
is valuable. The purpose of this research is to determine whether there is a significant correlation 
between the levels of fair value assets/liabilities in banks and/or the classifications of fair value 
assets/liabilities to total liabilities and the distressed or stable state of banks. If such a correlation 
is found with the ratios that have total assets/liabilities as a denominator, it would suggest that 
banks are taking different levels of risk when they are distressed than when they are not. If the 
correlation is with the ratios that have fair value assets/liabilities as a denominator, it would 
mean that fair value assets/liabilities need greater scrutiny and regulation as it might provide 
evidence that managers intentionally classified assets as level 3, and might suggest that fair value 
assets and/or liabilities played a major role in the financial crisis of 2008.  
In addition to finding whether the fair value assets/liabilities are correlated with the 
stability of the bank, it would also suggest that banks use fair value accounting in different ways 
when under distress. This is an important question to ask because one major piece of the debate 
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about the financial crisis and its resolution relates to banks’ and financial institutions’ much 
greater use of fair value accounting (also known as mark-to-market accounting). Banks classify 
fair value assets and liabilities as level 1, level 2, or level 3. A level 1 asset is one for which a fair 
value need not be estimated; it is observable in the market. For example, a T bill or stock from a 
publicly traded company has an observable market price established independently of the 
company that holds it. A level 2 asset is one whose price is determined using a model that is 
based on level 1 assets. For example, a stock option is not sold on the open market but there are 
models, such as the Black Scholes Option Pricing Model (Black & Scholes, 1973), which are 
commonly accepted as establishing a price. A level 3 asset is one for which the value is largely 
an estimate. A company can determine its own model for measuring the asset value as well as the 
inputs. Most financial derivatives are level 2 or 3 assets that are generally used to hedge against 
various types of company-specific risk. These derivatives exist to cover a wide variety of 
potential risks, including foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, and even risks from changes in 
weather. Valuation of these derivatives and fair value assets can therefore be very difficult, and 
this raises some major criticisms about the way in which fair value accounting was used during 
the financial crisis. 
 In the aftermath of the financial crisis, there was criticism as to the possibility of bank 
managers actively classifying fair value assets and liabilities as level 3 to take advantage of the 
ability to use internally developed models to value them (Webinger et al. 2013). There were also 
concerns as to the risk appetites of banks when they were distressed and whether or not TARP 
affected the willingness of banks to take risks in areas including investments and lending (Black 
& Hazelwood, 2013). With this in mind, we have two testable hypotheses. First the portfolio 
effect, banks will have a higher appetite for risk when they are not distressed, meaning that banks 
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under distress will have lower levels of fair value assets relative to total assets. Second the 
classification effect, banks under distress will have higher level 3 assets and liabilities as a 
percentage of fair value assets and liabilities, to reflect management opportunism in intentionally 
classifying assets and liabilities as level 3. 
Literature Review 
The 2008 financial collapse and its aftermath provide a large literature base and many 
potential questions to study. Some early questions regarding the collapse and TARP revolved 
around whether or not TARP succeeded in its goals of increasing lending from the banking 
industry, preventing a larger collapse of the banking industry and of the general economy (Li, 
2010), and relieving businesses and homeowners that were under distress (Barofsky, 2012). 
Others held a more negative view of TARP, arguing that banks gained competitive advantages or 
that TARP increased “moral hazard” (Black & Hazelwood, 2013) (Berger & Roman, 2013). 
Other research questions focus on the effects of fair value accounting, whether it contributed to 
the crash and recession (Laux & Leuz, 2009), whether it is associated with risk (Lev & Zhou, 
2009), and whether banks were opportunistic in classifying these assets to avoid excessive write 
downs (Webinger et al. 2013).  
In terms of evaluating TARP’s success, there is good evidence that TARP likely 
prevented a larger collapse of the banking system and the overall economy. According to Li 
(2010) research, TARP did succeed in increasing lending by large banks, but there were still 
complaints that some banks simply held on to significant amounts of the money. Even so, the 
increase in lending by large banks would mean that TARP had a significant and positive 
economic impact. 
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However, this does not mean that TARP’s implementation was not criticized. One 
important criticism of the program is that TARP as it was implemented was only directed toward 
banks and other financial institutions, and not toward other businesses or homeowners who were 
being foreclosed upon (Barofsky, 2011). This was true despite the fact that the act of Congress 
that created TARP authorized the Treasury to modify mortgages to maintain ownership. In other 
words, TARP was only successful in stabilizing the banks, and not in any broader purpose it may 
have had for individuals and other businesses. This might show that the overall economic impact 
of TARP may not have been as large as it was intended to be. 
A major piece of the debate about the financial crisis and its resolution relates to banks’ 
and financial institutions’ much greater use of fair value accounting (also called mark-to-market 
accounting). Some people believed that much of the reason for the crash was that the fair market 
value of these assets (particularly levels 2 and 3) declined very rapidly (faster and more severely 
than their true value), thus causing banks to record massive losses and investor panic. According 
to Lev and Zhou (2009), however, the real issue is not fair value assets, which are mostly level 1 
or 2 (though level 3 assets would create this concern), but with fair value liabilities, which are 
mostly level 2 or 3 and therefore concern investors much more due to the level of risk. Most 
existing academic research on this issue has focused on the question of whether or not the way 
banks have used fair value accounting was a contributing factor in the financial collapse of 2008. 
For example, Lev and Zhou (2009) research suggested that an investor “flight to quality” was 
mostly the result of excess level 2 and 3 assets and liabilities. However, other papers have 
concluded that there was not an excessive devaluation of these assets (i.e. a write-down larger 
than the actual decline in the assets’ value) to cause investor panic. Laux and Leuz (2009) find 
that fair value accounting did not cause these write-downs of the fair value assets larger than the 
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actual decline in their value. In fact, they state that they found more instances of overvaluation 
than undervaluation. This would seem to suggest that fair value accounting is not the problem, 
and may actually have helped secure the banking system (Laux & Leuz, 2009). 
Other academic studies have focused on the question of moral hazard or increased risk 
taking in banks because of TARP. The idea of moral hazard can be described as asking the 
question of whether banks will take these great risks again because they believe the federal 
government will bail them out. According to Black and Hazelwood (2013), risk-taking tended to 
increase at large TARP banks and decrease at small TARP banks. Part of this may be explained 
by the Li (2010) study, which stated that larger banks increased lending more (and thus to riskier 
debtors), but it could also be an argument that TARP did increase moral hazard, as the failure of 
large banks would be more likely to concern the federal government enough to consider a 
bailout, which would not be the case for failure of smaller banks. Lending some credence to this 
argument, another study found that banks with more exposure to risky level 3 assets tended to 
have better political connections (Kostovetsky, 2011). However, this research did not answer 
whether they took the risk because of their political connections or pursued the connections 
because of increased risk. 
Another question that has been asked is whether TARP caused misallocation of funds and 
distortion of competition. Berger and Roman (2013) found that banks that received TARP funds 
and paid them back early gained significant competitive advantages. They also found that TARP 
and other banking guarantees did distort competition and cause the misallocation of funds 
(Berger & Roman, 2013). This suggests that it is possible that TARP itself could change the ratio 
of fair value assets and liabilities to total assets and liabilities. We control for this by selecting 
the period before the receipt of funds and of repayment of TARP funds. Since the balance sheet 
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reflects balances at the end of the period, the ratios for banks when they were not distressed 
would not be affected by the presence of the funds. 
Research on whether bank managers may have been opportunistic in classifying fair 
value assets has also already been done, particularly in light of SEC guidance enabling managers 
to reclassify more fair value assets into level 3. However, even with this guidance in place, 
Webinger, Bloom, and Comer (2013) find that no evidence that financial firms abused the 
latitude inherent in FSP 157-4.They do find an increase in fair value disclosures, which was 
something we also noticed as we gathered data from bank statements using the SEC’s EDGAR 
database.  We similarly examine if more fair value assets or liabilities are composed of levels 2 
and/or 3 during the recession using banks which received and repaid TARP funds. Webinger, 
Bloom, and Comer use a sample consisting of 122 Fortune 1000 financial firms in 2007 that 
survived in 2009. Since our research focuses on banks which received TARP funds, and not just 
the largest ones, we can analyze this research question from a different perspective. Furthermore, 
in focusing on TARP specifically, we can have a better idea of whether a bank’s state of distress 
would make them more or less likely to abuse the SEC’s guidance. 
We intend for our research to be integrated with the existing literature in that we will use 
the actual balance sheets and financial data from the banks to answer questions that the existing 
literature raises. Past research suggests that we should control for bank size in our data 
collection, as that seems to be a determining factor for what actions banks undertake. Another 
important variable is the level of the fair value assets and liabilities, as this is likely to be a good 
measure of how risky the banks’ portfolio truly is. 
The Lev and Zhou (2009) study along with the Black and Hazelwood (2013) research can 
allow us to gather some information for the question of banks’ appetites for risk in the immediate 
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aftermath of the housing bubble crash. The Laux and Leuz (2009) study and the Webinger, 
Comer, and Bloom (2013) research both provide a basis for the question of management 
opportunism or whether the managers used potentially problematic fair value accounting to 
reclassify assets to avoid write-downs of the banks’ fair value assets. Other research gives us an 
idea of what variables to control for, such as the Berger and Roman (2013) research and 
Kostovetsky (2011) paper on banks with high level 3 assets.  The existing literature gives us a 
solid basis for our research questions. 
Methodology 
We have obtained the financial statements of public banks which received TARP money 
for the quarter before receipt and for the quarter of final repayment. Using the SEC’s EDGAR 
database, we were able to look at these financial statements for the period immediately before 
receiving a bailout and the period in which the bailout money is paid back. We gathered data 
such as total assets, liabilities, fair value assets and liabilities by level for the 153 public banks in 
our sample. We then used SPSS to run T-tests to measure differences in means and logit 
regressions to measure changes based on whether the bank is distressed. We represent this with a 
binary variable, with 1 representing a bank while distressed and 0 while not distressed.  
In our analysis, we use ratios, such as fair value assets to total assets, fair value liabilities 
to total liabilities, ratios based on which level the assets and liabilities are in, as well as the 
balance sheet data itself. Should one or more of these prove to be significantly correlated with 
the “distressed” variable in these regressions, it could suggest that fair value assets and/or 
liabilities are treated differently when the banks are distressed versus when they are not. After 
this portion of data analysis is complete, the results are compiled into several tables showing data 
such as the number of observations, the test statistic, and the p value, among others. 
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In terms of analyzing the data, whichever level(s) or ratio(s) are correlated most strongly 
with the binary “distressed” variable are the ones which are most likely to be treated differently 
during a crisis. In our data collection, the majority of fair value assets banks hold appear to be 
level 2, so these assets are particularly likely to be a main driver behind any such correlation 
involving fair value assets. 
 One problem we ran into in conducting this research was what to do with banks’ netting 
adjustments on their fair value assets. Since these netting adjustments were not separated by 
level, we show each level “as is” but include the netting adjustment in the total fair value asset 
figure. This allows us to have an accurate level of risk both for expressing each level as a 
percentage of total fair value assets (though all percentages in this ratio will be higher), as well as 
for the ratio of fair value assets to total assets. 
 Another point to note was the much lower n for the ratios of level 1, 2, and 3 fair value 
liabilities to fair value liabilities. This is because many banks, particularly smaller banks, do not 
have fair value liabilities, so for the other ratios involving them, the result would be zero, but for 
the ratios just mentioned, zero appears in the denominator, so there is no valid result to give in 
these cases. 
 For our research, we ran three logit regression models. The first two models test ratios of 
fair value assets/liabilities to total assets/liabilities, the first one in aggregate and the second one 
broken down by level. This measures what we call the “portfolio effect,” or a bank’s willingness 
to hold these assets or liabilities. The third model tests ratios of the level 1, 2, and 3 
assets/liabilities to fair value assets/liabilities. This measures the “classification effect,” or 
whether banks may have placed these assets into different levels before receiving TARP versus 
after they paid it back. 
 
10 
 
Results 
 As explained in the methodology section, we ran descriptive statistics, a pairwise test of 
means, and a logit regression under three different models with “distressed” as a binary variable, 
with 1 representing a distressed bank and 0 representing a bank after it has repaid TARP funds. 
Overall, we find evidence to support the portfolio effect; banks have a lower appetite for risk 
when distressed.  We find weak support for the classification effect; managers classify more fair 
value assets as level 3 when distressed. 
 The pairwise test of means establishes a significant difference in means for the ratio of 
fair value assets to total assets, the ratios of levels 2 and 3 assets to both total fair value assets 
and total assets, and level 1 liabilities to total liabilities. We give these variables further analysis 
with a logit regression to see if these differences in the variables have any predictive power, 
since the test of means establishes some evidence for both a “portfolio effect” and a 
“classification effect.” 
(Insert Table 2) 
 The test of means shows very strong evidence (p value <.001) that the ratio of fair value 
assets to total assets is significantly lower when banks are distressed, and that this difference is 
driven primarily by level 2 assets. There is evidence (p value = .014) that the ratio of level 3 
assets to fair value assets is higher when a bank is distressed, while the ratio of level 2 assets to 
fair value assets is lower (p value = .028). In fair value liabilities, there is evidence that level 1 
liabilities are lower when a bank is distressed (p value = .041), and marginal evidence of higher 
level 3 liabilities (p value = .074). 
 We ran the logit regression using three models. For the first model, only the ratios of fair 
value assets to total assets and fair value liabilities to total liabilities are used. The second model 
uses the ratios of fair value assets and liabilities by level to total assets or liabilities. The third 
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model looked to see if the composition of fair value assets or liabilities changes (i.e. there are 
more or fewer assets or liabilities of a particular level within fair value assets or liabilities). The 
first two of these models help determine the portfolio effect; banks’ appetites for risk change 
when they are distressed.  While the last one helps explain the classification effect; whether 
managers are being opportunistic and, for example, moving level 2 assets into level 3 to take 
advantage of the increased subjectivity of the estimates. 
(Insert Table 3) 
 Model 1 finds that both variables are significant in predicting whether or not a bank is 
distressed. When a bank is distressed, the ratio of fair value assets to total assets is significantly 
lower, while the ratio of fair value liabilities to total liabilities is significantly higher. This 
suggests that banks’ fair value liabilities increased, so they were not willing to accept as much 
risk in fair value assets. Model 2 shows that this effect is mostly driven by level 2 fair value 
assets. This was the expected result, as a majority of fair value assets that banks hold fall in level 
2. We suspect that level 2 liabilities are a driver for Model 1’s findings regarding fair value 
liabilities but are unable to find significant results likely due to lack of power.  Part of the reason 
for this is that not all banks have fair value liabilities, so they are not present in the data as the 
denominator for the ratios would be zero. 
 Model 3 asks the question of whether managers reclassified their fair value assets within 
the levels. We do not find support for this hypothesis. None of the p values are close to where 
they would have to be to support the hypothesis. We can only conclude that the proportion of fair 
value assets/liabilities for each level cannot predict the distressed or stable state of a bank. 
 Taken together, we find no compelling evidence from the logit regression for the 
classification effect or that bank managers have been opportunistic in reclassifying their fair 
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value assets or liabilities into higher levels to take advantage of increased subjectivity in the 
estimates for the values of these assets and liabilities. We do find evidence for the portfolio 
effect or that banks have a lower appetite for risky fair value assets when they are distressed, and 
that level 2 assets are the primary driver of this difference. 
Conclusion 
 In conducting tests for our three models, we do not find strong evidence for the idea that 
bank managers were intentionally opportunistic in reclassifying fair value assets and liabilities in 
order to avoid massive write-downs in their value. However, we find significant evidence that 
banks’ risk appetites were lower when they were distressed, and increased again after complete 
repayment of TARP funds. This suggests that even though banks’ risk appetites had changed, 
there was no intentional reclassification of assets into level 3. 
 These results are important in that they support other studies that find that bank managers 
did not abuse SEC guidance to reclassify assets, supporting the Webinger, Bloom, and Comer 
(2013) research. We find support for the “portfolio effect” in models 1 and 2 of the logit. The 
recession changed banks’ risk appetites, which in turn can help us understand how banks 
approach risk when they are under significant distress. The Laux and Leuz (2009) study suggests 
that we can rule out the idea that the decrease in these fair value assets has to do with excessive 
write-downs of these assets as the market crashed. We can also rule out the effects of volatility in 
options markets as the market crashed, as we would expect level 3 assets (derivatives) to undergo 
a similar crash, which they did not. In doing so, we can see that banks hold more level 2 assets as 
they are able to repay their TARP funds. This is important in seeing whether or not banks’ 
willingness to take risks in other areas changed from the time immediately before receipt of 
TARP funds to the time immediately after these funds were repaid. 
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 In seeing that risk appetites changed as a result of the financial crisis and the banks’ 
distressed states and by finding strong evidence for a “portfolio effect,” we can see the 
implications this might have for financial crises in the future. If banks have lower risk tolerance 
when they are distressed, then it is possible to advocate policy action that would rectify this and 
enable banks to lend money to people even during times of financial distress. Similarly, if risk 
taking is too high when banks are not distressed, more regulation of fair value assets and 
liabilities may be necessary, as these are important indicators of risk. 
Future studies could build on our research by focusing on the period immediately after 
receipt of TARP funds, which would enable us to see if TARP funds themselves changed bank 
risk appetites. This would also build on the Li (2010) study by providing another way to 
determine whether banks did simply hold onto the TARP money rather than lending it out. 
Another study could also approach the question of whether banks with more fair value assets 
during the financial crisis repaid their TARP funds sooner than banks with fewer such assets. 
In other words, this research is important in supporting other research that has already 
been done, but also proposes new questions about the behavior of banks and management during 
a financial crisis. Other research will be able to build on the conclusions reached in this study to 
be able to answer other questions about the crisis, TARP, and risk taking behavior in banks in the 
United States. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 N Mean St Dev Min Max 
Distressed 310 .5 .501 0 1 
TA 307 75141.85 310103.49 286 2251469 
TL 307 68795.7 284994.32 252 2105626 
FVA 306 25848 119962.04 0 840133 
FVL 306 8493.25 48558.02 -21785 386732 
L1/FVA 297 .04955 .13312 0 1 
L2/FVA 305 .94075 .311441 0 4.445 
L3/FVA 305 .05271 .131371 -.014 1 
L1/FVL 139 .11174 .229695 0 1 
L2/FVL 139 1.103343 1.157681 0 8.117 
L3/FVL 139 .10946 .258333 0 1 
L1/TA 306 .00887 .025088 0 .169 
L2/TA 306 .17364 .120488 0 .913 
L3/TA 306 .00796 .016174 -.003 .096 
L1/TL 304 .002109 .0108936 -.013 .0993 
L2/TL 304 .018279 .0918469 -.0815 .8232 
L3/TL 304 .001125 .0047668 -.0074 .0399 
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Table 2 Test of Means1 
Variable Mean difference t statistic p value 
FVA2 -1938.862 -1.160 .248 
FVL3 1055.9697 .684 .495 
FVA/TA4 -.044390121 -8.235 .000*** 
FVL/TL5 -.000439305 -.500 .618 
L1A6/TA .00010 .062 .950 
L2A/TA -.05327 -8.756 .000*** 
L3A/TA .00213 .00420 .043** 
L1L7/TL -.00056 -2.061 .041** 
L2L/TL -.00479 -1.597 .112 
L3L/TL .00048 1.799 .074* 
L1A/FVA -.006693678 -.493 .623 
L2A/FVA -.064390934 -2.214 .028** 
L3A/FVA .0267767181 2.492 .014** 
L1L/FVL .0180321747 .603 .549 
L2L/FVL -.125627962 -1.120 .268 
L3L/FVL -.001245804 -.081 .936 
 
  
                                                          
1
 The mean difference of a firm’s level of a particular variable immediately preceding the acceptance of TARP funds 
and immediately following the repayment of TARP funds. 
2
 Fair Value Assets 
3
 Fair Value Liabilities 
4
 Scaled by Total Assets 
5
 Scaled by Total Liabilities 
6
 Level one Fair Value Assets 
7
 Level one Fair Value Liabilities 
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Table 3: Binary Logistic Regression 
 Model 1 (FVA/TA(L)) Model 2 (Levels/TA(L)) Model 3 (Levels/FVA(L)) 
FVA/TA .-6.733 
(.000***) 
  
FVL/TL 8.149 
(.017**) 
  
L1A/TA  -.141 
(.987) 
 
L2A/TA  -7.723 
(.000***) 
 
L3A/TA  10.673 
(.270) 
 
L1L/TL  -6.908 
(.700) 
 
L2L/TL  4.531 
(.104) 
 
L3L/TL  49.577 
(.279) 
 
L1A/FVA   -1.579 
(.524) 
L2A/FVA   -.812 
(.325) 
L3A/FVA   2.780 
(.273) 
L1L/FVL   1.141 
(.181) 
L2L/FVL   .089 
(.663) 
L3L/FVL   .011 
(.988) 
N 306 304 139 
Cox & Snell R Square .071 .100 .044 
Nagelkerke R Square .094 .133 .058 
 
 
